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Research was conducted to examine the validity of the
employment of 0. S. Navy helicopters for the combat search
and rescue (CSAR) mission. It is proposed that the Navy
dees not currently have the capability to conduct CSAR oper-
ations in an opposed environment with an acceptable loss
rate. A mission description is offered including mission
essentials, phases and profile. Current Battle Group heli-
copter assets are presented. Training and equipment
shortfalls are noted. A discussion of resource management
includes dollar, political and psychological costs. A
proposal is offered to initiate a viable CSAR capability
that recognizes the need for CSAR and makes its tactical
development a matter of CNO policy, develops an appreciation
for the fact that this is a TACAIR problem, and suggests a
measured approach to solving the problem. Finally, a deci-
sion matrix is presented to assist the Battle Group
Commander in the employment of his helicopter assets in the
pursuit of a CSAR mission.
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I. AN EX AM114X19.1 QL MISSION VALIDITY
A. BACKGROUND
It is proposed that the bulic of future Naval Air action
and attendant losses will occur in limited warfare or during
strategic attack and interdiction. The loss of Naval
aircraft implies the existence of downed aircrewmen and
points to the continuing requirement for a traditional
combat search and rescue (CSAR) operational capability. It
is recognized that due to the dramatically changing threat
environment, tactics employed by Navy helicopter crews in
the Viet Nam era are not applicable over a large range of
scenarios. However, until vertical lift technologies
present us with a suitable alternative, the helicopter
remains the most versatile air vehicle available, if not the
only one, for the retrieval of downed aircrewman.
It is a sad fact that peacetiae efforts to economize
have all but obliterated any Navy capability to conduct CSAR
in an opposed environment. Expertise is currently reposed
in one reserve squadron which is attempting to maintain a
nucleus for future capabilities in spite of inadequate
equipment and insufficient funding. This is the result of a

de-emphasis on CSAR in the years following Viet Nam--a
de-emphasis highlighted by the removal of CSAR from the
required operational capability listings of Navy helicopter
squadrons in the mid 1970*3. The mission has been relegated
to apparent insignificance due to the absence of a vital
Navy policy. JCS PUB 2 states that "any available aircraft,
ship, land vehicle or personnel rssource may be employed
durin-g recovery operations subject to the authorization and
direction of the Theater Commander" and "assigns responsi-
bility for search and rescue operations in support of Naval
Task Forces to the Task Force Commander." The Navy addendum
to NWP 37, the National Search and Rescue Manual, further
tasks the Battle Group (33) Commander with search and rescue
responsibilities for his own force. Beyond this, equipment,
training and tactical doctrine are painfully absent.
In light of the above, it is apparent that the Battle
Group Commander should not have the idea that he has a
viable CSAR capability. let, it is a widely held belief
that should Navy aircrewmea be downed in a hostile environ-
ment, Navy helicopter assets assigned to our Battle Groups
would be tasked with the CSAR mission. Every helicopter and
TACAIR aircrewman interviewed agreed with this premise. The

question of mission validity must therefore be addressed.
It is the purpose herein to present this problem in gross
form, examine mission validity, and propose a path of action
toward the establishment of a viable CSAR capability.
B. CSAR EXPERTISE
Navy CSAR experience in North Viet Nam can be succintly
summarized:
[Ref. 1: p. 22].
These very heavy losses are not an adverse reflection on the
many brave aircrews who stood in great peril to rescue
downed comrades. Rather they serve to highlight the inten-
sity of the threat, the inadequacy Df the equipment and the
state of aircrew CSAR training at the time. In time of war,
when readiness should have been at a peak, we were clearly
not prepared to successfully conduct CSAR operations in an
opposed environment with an acceptable loss rate. It is
suggested xhat in the current time of peace, with the CSAR
mission being de-emphasized while opposing technology has
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increased the threat by orders of magnitude, we certainly
cannot expect to improve upon our record in Vist Nam unless
we initiate major actions to remedy this situation.
Even more insidious than current mission de-emphasis is
the erosion of experience brought about by the passage of
time. Today's helicopter community cadre numbers few avia-
tors with actual CSAR experience. To a large extent, the
expertise born of necessity in combat is gone. The only
Navy squadron presently pursuing CSAR tactical development
is Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Nine (HC-9) , a reserve
squadron whose efforts to preserve and expand the Navy's
tactical CSAR capabilities are, in the author's opinion,
extremely impressive. These professionals are the ones who
should be called upon to lead in the development of a viable
capability. Their expertise must be passed on to the
regular forces, for, due to the response requirements
dictated by the mission, highly trained, well equipped
aircrews must be on scene when hostilities commence.
C. HISSION DESCRIPTION
A full scale mission definition is beyond the scope of
this thesis. However, a description of the mission is
essential to an understanding of the variables and
11

constraints involved. Therefore, a brief discussion of
mission essentials, phases and profile follows.
1 • Mis sion Essentials
Essential to the CSAR mission is response time,
pinpointing survivor location and the capacity to conduct
extended operations. Ths minimization of response time
presupposes advanced planning. When Navy aircraft are
launched on a hostile target, CSAH considerations should
have already resulted in a well conceived plan of action
which accounts for all probable scenarios. This is particu-
larly important in view of the relatively slow speed and
limited range of the air rescue vehicle (helicopter) in
comparison to Navy tactical air assets.
Pinpointing the location of the survivor is of the
essence. Tactical aircraft fly at such speeds that large
areas can be covered by a damaged aircraft prior to bailout
by the crew. This presents a large geographic area to
complicate the search phase. Onca located, problems of
establishing communication with the downed aircrewman as
well as authenticating his identification must be solved.
As probable targets for strategic attack and inter-
diction are located deep within many nations' land masses,
12

the possibility of extended operations demands considera-
tion. Battle Group helicopter assets are not capable of air
to air refueling, and must therefore either land to take on
fuel or HIFR (helicopter in flight refuel) from a capable
surface vessel. The limited speed and range of the heli-
copter restricts the distance a rescue effort may penetrate,
even over a non-hostile land mass.
2- Mission Phases
The phases of the CSAR mission are recognized as
search, suppression, pick up and egress. The search phase
is probably best performed by tactical aircraft on scene.
With faster speed and heavier firepower, they are less
susceptible to possible shoot down than the low flying, slow
moving helicopter. In normal circumstances, the search
phase should be coincident with helicopter transit and
concluded prior to the helicopter's arrival in the pick up
area. Ideally, the search phase should be completed prior
to the helicopter going "feet dry" (over land).
As the helicopter a pproaches the pick up area, the
suppression phase commences. Escort and on scene aircraft
coordinate to suppress enemy fire to the maximum extent
possible. The helicopter is virtually incapable of actively
13

defending itself during this phase, since current configura-
tion of Battle Group helicopters does not include defensive
weapons for employment against either air or ground forces.
Once hostile fire is suppressed, the helicopter
moves in to commence the pick up phase. It is at this time
that the mission is at its most critical, in that the heli-
copter is most susceptible whils it lands or hovers to
extract the downed aircrewnan. The coordinated suppression
of hostile fire remains critical to mission success.
A successful mission does not terminate with extrac-
tion, because the helicopter must then egress, again
through hostile territory. The mission is complete only
when the rescuee is deposited with friendly forces in a
secure area.
3 . Mis sion Profile
Mission profiles obviously vary greatly, depending
upon geographic locale, composition of U.S. and enemy
forces, environmental factors and terrain features.
However, a typical scenario would be as follows. Coincident
to the launching of strike forces, helicopters tasked with
provisional CSAR responsibilities are positioned close to
the hostile coast line, either at airborne holding or
14

positioned on air capable ships. Once the decision is made
by the Battle Group Commander to prosecute a CSAR effort,
briefings are completed and the helicopter proceeds-
Conditions permitting, both RESCAP (rescue combat air
patrol) and RESCORT (rescue escort) aircraft are dispatched
to accompany the helicopter as it proceeds to the pick up
area. Flight profile for the helicopter once feet dry is in
the terrain following mode, flying as low and fast as
possible to expedite entry while taking advantage of terrain
features to mask the helicopter from hostile fire.
Navigation is a problem here, in that Battle Group heli-
copter pilots do not receive dead reckoning navigation
training that would enable them to successfully locate the
pick up area under any less than ideal, unopposed condi-
tions. Reliance on RESCORT aircraft for navigation is
necessary. Once in the pick up area, survivor locale is
assessed, and the Helicopter Aircraft Commander (HAC)
decides whether or not a pick up is feasible. The heli-
copter is either landed or brought into a hover over the
downed aircrewman, and the pick up ensues. The instant the
rescuee is brought on board, the helicopter commences egress
escorted by RESCORT/RESCAP aircraft, again using terrain
15

following, but not by the same route as entry was made. The
mission is complete whan the rescuee is deliyered to
friendly forces in a secure area. ; sic 2
D. BATTLE GROUP CSAR ASSETS
1 • Helicopter Assets
Current Battle Group helicopter assets typically
include the following mix:
Six SH-3H Sea King helicopters. Based on the
carrier, their primary mission is to provide in-close anti-
submarine warfare protection. They are the only air assets
available to fulfill this role. Maximum speed: 120 knots.
Endurance: on the order of four hours and thirty minutes
[Ref. 2: p. 1-133]-
One or two SH-2F Saa Sprite helicopters. Stationed
on frigates and destroyers, their primary mission is to
provide antisubmarine warfare protection for the Battle
Group out to the second convergence zone. (Note:
Convergence zones occur at intervals of 30-35 miles in
temperate and tropical latitudes [Ref. 3: p. 151]. Maximum
speed: 140 knots. Endurance: on the order of two hours
and thirty minutes [Ref. 4: p. 1-121].
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Two CH-46E Sea Knight helicopters. Stationed on
support ships, their primary mission is the vertical replen-
ishment of the Battle Group. Maxiaum speed: 145 knots.
Endurance: on the order of one hour and forty-five minutes
[Ref. 5: pp. 1-143—1-148].
None of these helicopters were designed for the CSAR
mission. They lack the speed, range and low level naviga-
tion capabilities to prosecute the mission. They were not
designed to withstand largs amounts of damage. They have no
countermeasures, they present a high radar cross section,
are noisy, and have no IR (infra-red) suppression, making
them easy prey to hostila weapons systems. Furthermore,
they do not have a weapon capable of suppressing even small
arms fire while in the pick up zone. In all, they are
poorly equipped for the CSAR mission and are extremely vuln-
erable. This severely limits the probability of successful
prosecution of a CSAR mission in an opposed environment.
2- Aircrew Training
Battle Group helicopter aircrews are extremely
capable of operating in a myriad of SAR environments. The
training received makes them capable, confident profes-
sionals in this field. With respsct to CSAR, AIRPAC HS
17

squadrons frequently deploy to NAS Fallon to rehearse
various scenarios with their Air Groups. This is, however,
the only CSAH training presented to the Battle Group, and it
is inadequate. It is inadequate in that the approach taken
is one of practice vice instruction. The aircrews are
called upon to practice skills that they are not trained in.
Aircrew training in general takes place at two
levels, the Training Comma nd and the Replacement Air Groups
(RAGs). However, the Training Command does not offer SAR
training. Furthermore, although CSAR may be informally
discussed in student/ instructor briefs, there is no part of
the syllabus directed toward this subject. HS, HS (L) and HC
RAGs conduct basic SAR training, but do not address CSAR
skills. The nugget (first tour aviator) arrives at his
squadron with only a vague feeling for what CSAR is all
about. If the nugget is assigned to an HS squadron, he may
practice CSAR rudiments at NAS Fallon without the benefit of
a formal syllabus. If instead he goes to an HS (L) or HC
squadron, the first time he may participate in a CSAR evolu-
tion could readily be the real thitig. Such practice can
only result in the proliferation of downed aircrewmen--or
worse. Furthermore, the lack of a formal CSAR training
18

syllabus for Battle Group helicopter pilots is a serious
deficiency that can predictably lead to the loss of lives
and irreplacable Battle Group helicopter assets.
E. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
1 . Basics
Any discussion of the prosecution of the CSAR
mission utilizing current Battle Group helicopter assets can
be simplified into one core question: Can the Battle Group
Commander afford to risk his helicopter assets in the
pursuit of a mission for which his aircraft are ill equipped
and his crews poorly trained? The answer to this question
is certainly subject to a number of variables, but in its
gross form must be no. Should the CH-46ES be taken out of
action, there would be significant impact on the Battle
Group's ability to replenish underway. Their loss could
only be accounted for by spending increased amounts of time
alongside supply ships, a time of great susceptibility.
Similarly, the Battle Group Commander could not afford to
risk his few ASH helicopter assets. (The Commanding Officer
of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano has recently
learned at first hand the importance of the submarine threat
in modern warfare). The tradeoff involved in sending
19

untrained ASW aircrews on CSAR missions would be the poten-
tial rescue of a few souls weighed against the potential
loss of hundreds of livss should an enemy submarine get
through the screen. Such a, gamble is clearly ill advised.
2- Dollar Costs
The dollar cost of combat SAR efforts in the Viet
Nam era was the subject of an Air Force Air Rescue and
Recovery Service study: '•Cost Sf f = ctiveness of the Combat
SAR System." This study ravealed tha average cost to be on
the order of $70,510.00 in 1973 dollars [ Bef . 6: p. 32].
This amount would be almost doubled in today's dollars.
Keep in mind that this is not the cost for a successful
rescue, but for any CSAR attempt. Additional price tags
could be hung on aircraft losses, training investment losses
and the administrative costs associated with prisoners of
war (POWs) and the missing in action (MIA) . These prices,
however, lose their significance when compared to the polit-
ical and psychological costs involved.
3* Political Costs
The North Vietnamese were quick to realize and capi-
talize upon the political value of the prisioner of war.
The majority of these men were downed aviators. Due to the
20

brand of restricted warfare practiced by the U. S. in Viet
Nam and the strong antiwar sentiment dividing our popula-
tion, the manipulation of the PDW issue by our enamy
significantly contributed to the ojtcome of the war— one
which clearly favored the North Vietnamese. The prevention
of POWs is one goal of combat SAR. Although the existence
of even one American POW could be put to political advan-
tage, the absolute minimization of their numbers is possible
only through a thoughtful and concerted effort to maintain a
viable combat SAR capability.
**• Ps ychological Costs
Probably the most significant costs in the pursuit
of CSAR mission validity are the psychological costs
involved. The American ethic leads as to believe that if an
aviator is downed in combat, he has the right to expect that
his comrades will make every reasonable effort to effect his
rescue. Indeed, there is enough John Wayne in the average
fleet helicopter pilot that there would be no shortage of
volunteers to attempt even the most hazardous rescue--no
matter how ill advised J A cost benefit analysis would
undoubtedly show that unless chances of success were
extremely high, an attempt to perform the CSAR mission would
21

not be prudent. Yet, there is an unspoken understanding
that if American aviators are downed due to enemy action,
Battle Group helicopter assets will be utilized to come to
their rescue (as was done in Viet Nam, with the resultant
heavy losses) .
The TACAIR pilot has every reason to believe this is
true. Subtle indoctrination in this respect commences the
first time an American youngster views a war movie and
continues through his experiences in the training command
and into the fleet. The (J.S. Navy takes care of its own.
From the helicopter pilot* s point of view, combat rescue is
regarded as a true badge of honor; the most difficult,
dangerous and immensly rewarding evolution to which a pilot
can aspire. The opportunity to save the lives of one's
comrades is a longstanding ideal of the rotary wing
community.
Consider the psychological effect, then of sending
TACAIR pilots into combat with the knowledge that should
they be shot down, their rescue would not be attempted.
Consider the helicopter pilot being told that he could not
attempt the rescue of his fellows aviators. Consider the
impact on the American public of the realization that its
22

aviators could be treated as expendable. It can be argued
that the American ethic would not permit these conditions to
exist. The psychological crutch of combat search and rescue
is real, and can be considered part of the American fabric.
P. A PROPOSAL
Based upon the preceeding, it is advanced that:
—the CSAR mission is one of valid requirements,
--the Navy does not possess a viable CSAR
capability.
The proposal to initiate a viable CSAR capability is
three pronged:
-1- Recognize the need for CSAR and make its
tactical development a matter of CNO policy.
-2- Develop an appreciation of the fact that this
is a TACAIR problem. (The helicopter community
cannot begin to address it from within its own
resources)
.
-3- Pursue a measured approach to the establish-
ment of a viable CSAR capability.
The first point is obvious. Without CNO involvement,
resurgent tactical development is well nigh impossible. The
Office of the CNO must be convinced of the validity of the
23

mission, be educated as to the immediacy of its need and
offer its complete endorsement.
The second point recognizes the fact that although the
helo community will supply the aircrews and air rescue
vehicle, it cannot readily sponsor a program of such scope.
Sponsorship should more properly fall to the rACAIR commu-
nity, whose level of interest should equal or exceed that of
the rotary wing's, and whose resources are more closely
matched to the problem. Without direct TACAIR involvement,
the potential for program success is limited.
The measured approach to a solution is advanced in light
of the current state of the economy and the Congressional
mood of the time. With the flow of defense dollars going to
purchase equipment, the selling of a new program might meet
with formidable opposition. Therefore, the proposal
commences with the absolute minimum acceptable position and
proceeds to that which will offer a viable capability.
The minimum acceptable position attacks the complete
absence of training and equipment required to conduct CSAR
operations. First, a formal CSAR ground/flight training
syllabus for deploying helicopter aircrews is established.
Up to date tactical doctrine is presented, and the skills
24

needed to successfully conduct CS&R are instructed and prac-
ticed. Nap of the Earth (HOE) flight, low level navigation,
threat analysis, aerial evasion, insertion/extraction tech-
niques and weapons training are taught. Pilots are required
to demonstrate a minimum skill level in order to become
designated CSAR aircrewmen. Note that not all pilots have
to be so designated; only enough to handle contingency
requirements for the duration of the deployment. The intent
here is not to make all of the helicopter aircrews expert,
for that is a full time, fully concerted effort. Rather, it
is to bring basic knowledge and skill levels of a select
group up to the point that the mission stands a reasonable
chance of success.
Second, Battle Group helicopters are brought up to a
configuration that enables their crews to effectively pros-
ecute the mission. This includes adding protection for
personnel and other essential components, IR suppression,
IR and radar countermeasures, comm/nav gear compatible with
all anticipated scenarios, downed aviator locator/identifier
equipment, defensive armament and an air-to-air capability.




A more effective but much more costly approach would be
the selection of a dedicated airframe. The U.S. Air Force
is currently acquiring an H-60 derivative called the Night
Hawk for its HX program. This helicopter has been designed
to operate in a hostile environment, and many survivablity
features have been included [Ref. 7 ]• The Navy is studying
this program and could gain much value from it. Since it is
also anticipating using the Navy version, the Sea Hawk, in
the LAMPS role, such an airframe should be put to work
within the following framework:
— 1 active duty and 1 reserve squadron on each
coast, with RAG functions conducted in house.
—Detachments from active duty squadrons deploy
with the Carrier Air Groups (CAGs) . Functionally
a part of the Air Group, they cover all CSAR
contingencies. (In order to maximize their
utility, and due to the similarity of flying
skills required, they could be tasked with the
covert insertion/extraction of special warfare
personnel)
.
The acquisition of a dedicated airframe should provide a
bona fide CSAR capability for the period of time that it
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takes to develop and acquire vertical lift technology
capable of overcoming the airspeed and range constraints in
current helicopter design. The JVX study is pointing toward
such an air vehicle. It must be emphasized, though, that we
cannot afford to disregard the requirement for CSAR while we
wait for such an advanced aircraft to come along. The adop-
tion of a dedicated helicopter airframe is a necessary
prerequisite.
G. CONCLUSION
It is hoped that the reader has increased his awareness
of the need for a viable Navy CSAR capability. The problems
associated with the development of such a capability have
been presented to lend credence to the concept of mission
validity. A proposal for the measured approach to the solu-
tion of the problem has been advanced. Although the casual
reader might jump at this chance for a quick fix to an
embarassing deficiency in overall readiness posture, it is
emphasized that this approach must be prosecuted throughout
its many layers to provide the potential for mission success




II. DECISION SUPPORT FOR THE BATTLE GROUP COMMANDER
A. INTRODUCTION
The Navy Addendum to N WP 37, the National Search and
Rescue Manual, tasks the Battle Group (BG) Commander with
search and rescue (SAR) responsibilities for his own force.
However, references to combat search and rescue (CSAR) were
eliminated from the required operational capabilities of
Navy helicopter squadrons in the mid 1970s- While the heli-
copter remains the best, if not the only, air rescue vehicle
available. Battle Group helicopter assets are not equipped
to conduct CSAR operations. More importantly, helicopter
aircrews are not trained for this difficult and dangerous
mission. The lack of a formal CSAR training syllabus has
made the effective prosecution of the mission in an opposed
environment a highly unlikely occurrence. Consequently, the
United States Navy Battle Groups do not have the organic
capability to conduct combat search and rescue.
Although there is one Reserve squadron that practices
CSAR, its activation could not be a certainty in limited
warfare, and any attempt to use U. 5. Air Force assets to
28

cover Navy CSAR requirements over the wide range of possible
scenarios is doomed to failure. The expertise generated
during the Viet Nam conflict has been largely lost to the
active forces, a victim of the passage of time and a general
de-emphasis in the CSAR mission. In light of the above, it
is obvious that the Battle Group Commander should not hold
the opinion that he has a viable CSAR capability. Yet, it
is a widely held belief that should aircrews be downed in
future action. Battle Group helicopter assets will be tasked
with the CSAR mission.
There is much that can be done to overcome this opera-
tional shortfall. Deploying helicopter aircrews could be
trained to the mission requirements, and Battle Group heli-
copters refitted with a complementary CSAR suit. More
appropriately, a dedicated airframe, such as the H-60 deriv-
ative selected for the Air Force HX project, could be
acquired to deploy with the Carrier Air Groups (CAGs) . The
long range approach toward the acquisition of a viable CSAR
capability would be through JVX technology--the future
assignment of an aircraft with airspeed and range more
closely associated with the TACAIR aircraft it supports.
29

This chapter does not attempt to deal with the require-
ments for establishing a viable CSAR capability. Rather,
its purpose is to offer a degree of decision support for the
Battle Group Commander in striving for the effective utili-
zation of future CSAR assets. In this regard, it is assumed
that equipment and training have been brought up to a
minimum acceptable level prior to deployment. A number of
variables are then examined within the bounds of realistic
constraints. The end product is a decision support matrix
designed to give qualitative guidance to the Battle Group
Commander in the formulation of his decision. Each variable
will be introduced, discussed briefly and then followed with
a statement of decision oriteria in order of preference.
Finally, the compiled decision matrix will be presented.
B. THE VARIABLES
CONDITION OF S OR VIVOR- -The primary item of concern in
the assignment of CSAR assets following a shoot down is the
condition of the survivor. First, is he alive? Was bailout
observed? Was he spotted on the ground? Is he injured?
The importance of this information's accuracy and timeliness




STATE o? SURVIVOR— A su bset of the previous variable is
the state of the survivor. He will almost certainly be
experiencing at least a mild state of shock. More crucial,
was he injured in bailout? Can he assist in his own rescue,
or will special provisions have to be made to effect his
pick up? Decision Criteria : uninjured or injured.
LOCATION—The exact location of the survivor must be
known. Tactical jet aircraft fly at high speeds, and a vast
amount of geographic area can be traversed after taking a
hit and prior to ejection. The restrictive range of current
Battle Group helicopters requires that to conserve fuel they
fly as nearly a direct route to the survivor as is safe
within the constraints of nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flight.
The optimization of flight path selection could be critical
to mission success. Pinpointing the survivor is essential
to this selection. Decision Criteria : known or unknown.
COMMUNICATIONS ESTABLISHED—The potential for mission
success is greatly enhanced by the establishment of communi-
cation with the survivor. His assessment of the situation
can greatly ease the solution of problems that can compound
the pick up phase. Additionally, the communications link
serves as the best means for authentication. Decis ion
Crite ria : yes or no.
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AUTHENTICATION-—The enemy successfully employed decep-
tive practices during Viet Nam CSAR missions that extracted
costs in both lives and aircraft lost. It is imperative
that the survivor's identity be authenticated prior to entry
into the pick up phase. De cision Criteria : yes or no.
IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE BATTLE GROUP— Here, the threat
to the Battle Group must be broken up by its nature. Each
threat, subsurface, surface and air, must be assessed on its
own merits and then by its contribution to the overall
threat. For example, the Battle Group Commander would not
want to send antisubmarine helicopters in pursuit of combat
rescue if the submarine threat was high. Decision
Criteria : low or high.
AVAILABILITY OF RESCUE AIRCRAFT--A question that seems
superficial, but one that has taken on critical overtones in
the past, concerns the availability Df rescue aircraft. Is
there a suitable air rescue vehicle ap and ready? Decis ion
Criteria : yes or no.
CAPABILITY OF RESCUE A IRCR AFT--rhis is a many faceted
question. If available, is the air rescue vehicle fully
CSAR capable? Does it possess the range required to
successfully conduct the mission within its particular
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constraints? Is its crew properly trained? In each case
the Decision Criteria are the same: yes or no.
RESCORT/RESCAP AV AILABI LITY—The availability of RESCORT
(rescue escort) and RES CAP (rescue combat air patrol)
aircraft are factors with significant effect on the outcome
of the CSAR mission, Unless the decision is made for covert
operations, with the helicopter proceeding independently,
RESCORT aircraft provide ascort services to the rescue heli-
copter on ingress and egress by neutralizing ground threats,
providing close-in support and assisting in navigation.
This latter point is critical, in that navigation over
hostile, unfamiliar terrain while flying NOE is extremely
taxing. Again, the limited range of Battle Group helicopter
assets does not permit arrors in navigation. RESCORT
support is critical if ground based opposition to the pick
up is expected, because RES CAP aircraft devote their efforts
to neutralization of enemy air threats. Both are critical
functions since Battle Group helicopters are not now
equipped with defensive capabilities. Decision Criteria :
yes or no.
AIR SUPERIORITY— Does the U. S. enjoy air superiority,
or is the counter air threat a force to be reckoned with?
Decision Criteria : yes or no.
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GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDER ATIONS— The topography to be
covered on ingress and egress demands consideration. Is the
anticipated mission profile in any way limiting to heli-
copter performance? Do population centers effect route of
flight? Are enemy strong points a factor? Is the topog-
raphy of the pick up zone a limiting factor? Decision
Criteria : satisfactory or unsatisfactory.
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS-- Environment al factors can signif-
icantly impact the probability of mission success. Will
nightfall be a factor over the course of the mission? Will
adverse weather help or hinder rescue attempts? Decision
Criteri a : satisfactory or unsatisfactory.
OPPOSED ENTRY—The restrictive range capabilities of
Battle Group helicopter assets could conceivably limit the
number of routes flown into a pick up area. Are all
possible flight paths exposed to some form of enemy threat?
Decision Criteria : no or yes.
LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS— This is a subjective judgement of
the Battle Group Commander, assisted by his staff
CSAR/helicopter officers. This point weighs all other
factors in a single subjective decision. Dec ision
Criteria : high or low.
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LIKELIHOOD 0? INCURRING ADDITIONAL L0332S--Based upon a
subjective assessment of the threat, what is the probability
of incurring additional losses thraugh prosecution of the
CSAR mission? Decision Cri teri a : low or high.
IMPACT OF LOSSES ON BATTLE GROUP— How would the poten-
tial loss of an ASW asset impact Battle Group antisubmarine
warfare posture? Could the potential loss of an H-46 seri-
ously impact vertical replenishment and cause increased
susceptibility to enemy attack as Battle Group ships are
forced to spend more time alongside to resupply? Can the
Battle Group afford to risk the loss of one of its few ASW
helicopter assets? Decision Criteria : satisfactory or
unsatisfactory.
C. THE DECISION SUPPORT MATRIX
The variables listed above are the major ones attendant
to the decision to employ helicopter assets for CSAR
missions. They call for and result in a number of decisions
made by a variety of individuals—CAS, Squadron Commanders,
the On Scene Commander, the Helicopter Aircraft Commander,
and RESCORT/RESCAP Aircraft Commanders, to name the most
prominent. The ultimate decision, however, resides with the
Battle GrouD Commander. He is the one who bears ultimate
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responsibility for the outcome of each mission. With this
in mind, the following decision support matrix has been
constructed to assist him in the decision making process.
Entry is made via the variables listed along the left.
Reading to the right, decision criteria are offered.
Proposed resultant action is displayed at the bottom and
includes selections to continue with the mission, to hold
for reconsideration, and to discontinue/abort. It is hoped
that the matrix will offer a degree of order to the many
variables involved and provide a fraiework for the produc-
tion of a decision which maximizes the probability of
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